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Abstract
New residential construction is an important indicator of economic health. Previous empirical
work demonstrates the profound power of housing starts in forecasting recession. Theoretical
research, backed by empirical study, suggests that home prices and interest rates are closely
related to the amount of residential investment. This paper attempts to better understand the
complex relationship between various factors that influence the supply and demand of new
housing; what information do suppliers and regulators use to determine how many new units of
housing will be constructed? Specifically, we will look at the respective state housing markets of
California, Oregon, and Washington by constructing an empirical model of the number of
housing permits issued. Our findings suggest that during the period from 2005 to 2019, the
number of annual housing permits issued, as a proxy for housing starts, is related negatively to
increases in, and higher levels of, 30-year mortgage rates and positively to increases in, and
higher levels of, 2-year Treasury bill rates. Short-term interest rates may have been a special
signalling mechanism for the health of the overall economy.
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Introduction
New residential construction is an important indicator of economic health. Not only as a
sign of a growing population, which might indicate future economic growth to come, new
construction also affects the ability for people to afford new homes. Builders and developers
willing to invest in constructing new housing units is an indicator of confidence in the economy
going forward.
Prior to 2009, the United States as a whole averaged roughly 1.5 million housing starts
annually, with a range from about 1 million in 1982 and 1991 up to 2.4 million in 1972. While
past recessions had been a result of bank runs, market crashes, oil price swings, or tech busts, the
Great Financial Crisis was directly tied to the housing market. Securities dependent upon
mortgages as the underlying asset became incredibly popular, and “insurance” in the form of
credit default swaps helped to magnify the eventual crash when the housing market went under.
The effective federal funds rate hit 1% in periods of 2003 to 2004. Before that, the last time the
federal funds rate was under 1% was from May to July of 1958, where it dropped to 0.63% in
May. From July 2007 to December 2008, the federal funds rate dropped from 5.26% to 0.16%.
While other recessions saw the federal funds rate cut for a few months, to have it rebound shortly
after, the federal funds rate did not surpass 0.2% from December 2008 to November 2015. The
federal funds rate began to rise again, and hit around 2.4% during the summer of 2019, and was
already going down before the COVID-19 pandemic, which caused rates to be cut to under 0.1%
in March 2020. It seems fair to say, then, that the period from 2005 to 2019 that is the focus of
this paper might be seen as an exceptional period in history, as the market has been under
expansionary policy for an extensive period of time to get the economy up and running again.
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We often hear complaints of skyrocketing home prices, particularly in booming cities like
San Francisco, Portland, and Seattle. Table 1 shows that, in both Oregon and Washington, home
values over the last 15 years have grown at a faster rate on average than personal income has
grown. Since 1960, median home prices have increased 121% nationally, while median
household income has increased only 29% (Tekin 2020). Additionally, all three of the top three
MSA’s in terms of the percentage of median income spent on mortgage payments are in
California (Lattice).
One might expect that the housing market could correct itself, or at least slow down the
increase in prices, by expanding the stock of housing. However, there are multiple parties and
factors involved in the expansion of housing stock. Firstly, housing is not a pure commodity that
is divisible, meaning that more than one housing unit cannot take up the same physical space.
The proximity of a unit to desirable environmental features, like jobs, good schools, etc. can
drive up the price of a home, so to prevent the upward spiral of prices in a competitive market,
builders would have to increase local density, creating externalities for those already in the area.
Essentially, new units will only be produced if builders believe the project will be profitable in
terms of net present value, and if the local government approves applications for construction.
Suppliers of new housing, then, must predict what their returns will be based on the price of
housing, ability of home-buyers to pay, and the number of homes that will be demanded. Local
governments presumably do not want unhappy citizens, and so must manage the addition of new
homes to their locale.
This paper attempts to better understand the complex relationship between various factors
that influence the supply and demand of new housing; what information do suppliers and
regulators use to determine how many new units of housing will be constructed? Specifically, we
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will look at the respective state housing markets of California, Oregon, and Washington by
constructing an empirical model of the number of housing permits issued.
When approaching the subject of housing starts or residential investment, research is
often conducted at the national level, and treated as a national indicator like GDP. For instance,
Leamer (2007) inspects the role of residential investment to macroeconomic recession as a
leading indicator of recession.
Mayer and Somerville (2000) use MSA-level data, but attempt to explain variation in
single-family permits by home prices with multiple lags, measures of regulatory delay in the
process, the change in the real prime rate, and the population.
This paper, alternatively, attempts to implement an expanded form of the theoretical
model using difference equations presented by Chiang (2005) in Chapter 17.5. I rearrange and
expand the “Market Model with Inventory”, then apply it to empirical data.

Literature Review
Leamer (2007) postulates that housing starts, the number of dwelling units upon which
construction has begun, and the change in housing starts are the prime predictors of the business
cycle phase that he has come across. It seems to me that if housing starts are a strong leading
indicator of recession, and we can determine the leading indicators of changes in housing starts,
then we can have an even better understanding of oncoming downturns, and potentially see them
coming further in advance. Out of ten recessions between World War II and 2007, eight have
been “preceded by substantial problems in housing and consumer durables”(Leamer). He
recommends a tighter monetary policy upon initial ascent of the cycle to avoid eventual
catastrophic crash, citing cyclical inertia as a powerful enough force to allow booms to ride
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themselves out while minimizing eventual busts. During expansions, while housing is not
maximally responsive to changes in interest rates, is a period in which monetary policy can be
enacted preventatively.
Leamer (2007) contends that, given the wide range of policies tested from 1972 to 2007,
the fact that the economy has reliably grown at roughly 3% per year, give or take 3% in either
direction, is an indicator that our focus should be upon addressing the cyclical nature of the
economy. He presents figures and data regarding the different contributors to this growth in real
GDP as a fraction of the overall rate. Residential Investment contributes a small percentage of
real GDP growth (leading up to 2007, around 4.2% out of 3.1% annual real GDP growth).
Leamer (2007) first subtracts the normal contribution of Residential Investment to growth
from the observed data, then cumulates the resulting “abnormal” contributions. By removing
data surrounding recessions, and subtracting the value of contribution to growth from residential
investment at cycle peaks, he presents an impressive set of figures. Reliably, we see a consistent
trend of residential investment contributing abnormally less to growth leading up to cycle peaks.
Chillingly, the steepest downward slope presented over the period post-World War II occurs
leading up to and during 2007, the time of publication of his paper.
Furthermore, measuring the cumulative contribution to weakness in GDP in the year
before recession, Leamer (2007) finds that six out of ten recessions have Residential Investment
as the leading contributor. On average, Residential Investment cumulatively contributes 22% to
weakness in GDP the year before these ten recessions, the highest contribution amongst
Durables, Exports, Equipment and Software, Nondurables, Federal Defense, Services, State and
Local, and Structures. Examining the seven “normal” recessions, excluding “the 1953 Defense
Downturn, the 2001 Internet Comeuppance and the ancient 1948 recession,” Leamer (2007)
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finds that contributions to GDP weakness the year before recessions changes dramatically.
Residential Investment then increases in average cumulative contribution from 22% to 25%,
Durables remains at 20%, and Services takes the third place spot at 11%. From this, Leamer
(2007) concludes that “it’s weakness in consumer spending that is a symptom of an oncoming
recessions.”
As the population of an area increases, it seems logical that the demand for new housing
would increase as well. While net migration rates have propped up residential investment in the
past, they “fell by more than 40% between 2016 and 2019. Indeed, in 2019 America’s population
grew at its slowest pace in a century”(The Economist).
Interest rates and house prices have been found to be influential over residential
investment. In this paper, we will study the relationship of both long-term 30-year rates and
shorter-term 2-year rates with the number of housing permits issued. House prices are also found
to be responsive to short-term interest rates, with Sutton et. al. (2017) finding a 5% increase in
home prices expected over time following a 1 percentage point cut to short-term interest rates.
While the connection between mortgage rates and residential investment might be more obvious,
in that higher rates for home-buyers should decrease demand for new homes, the short-term
interest rate is highly sensitive to the state of the general economy.
It is important to understand that the relationship between new supply and home prices is
dynamic, in that new supply is both in part determined and a determinant of prices. McCarthy
and Peach (2002) put forth a model describing long-term home prices from the supply side as a
function of the log investment rate and the construction cost index for single-family homes. The
demand curve describes long-term price as a function of the log of stock of housing, the log of
nondurables and services consumption, and the log of the user cost of holding the housing asset..
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Their short run supply equation describes the change in the investment rate as a function of a
number of variables: the difference between the actual home price and the theoretical price given
the supply function from the last period, the change in price, the change in construction costs, the
change in the short-term interest rate, the change in the price of land relative to the PCE deflator,
and the log of the quantity of new homes for sale. McCarthy and Peach (2002) find that after
1985, following deregulation of the mortgage market and an expansion of access to capital, the
coefficient of home price inflation when regressed on the investment rate becomes larger and
becomes statistically significant. Of the other independent variables, the real interest rate was
found to be the only other statistically significant variable, other than the error-correction term.
Continuing with our study of the relationship between new supply and home prices,
Mayer and Sommerville (2000) estimate that a one percent increase in home prices is followed
over the next 5 quarters by a 15 percent increase in new construction. They find that the steady
state level of construction is decreased by land use regulations. While development or impact
fees were shown to have a small negative effect on construction levels, regulations that delay
construction time or cause uncertainty with regards to permit and zoning approval were shown to
have a more significant negative impact on construction.
This paper attempts to apply a theoretical supply-demand framework to determine the
relationship between a number of different factors with the number of housing permits issued at
the state level, specifically for California, Oregon, and Washington. Study of new residential
construction is typically done at the national level, as an indicator of macroeconomic health.
Mayer and Somerville (2000) apply their model to MSA data, but are focused on the effect of
regulation on new construction. This paper, instead, includes explanatory variables like the
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vacancy rate and the lumber price index, as a proxy for construction costs, thus focusing more
upon housing market-specific factors.
Theory and Hypothesis Development
In Fundamentals of Economic Analysis, Chiang presents a framework for the
relationship between supply and demand as follows in Equations 1 and 2:

E quation 1 : Qdt = α − βP t

(α, β > 0)

Equation 2 : Qst = − γ + δP t−1

(γ, δ > 0)

Qdt is the quantity demanded at time t, α is the intercept, β is the price elasticity of demand,
and P t is the price at time t. Qst is the quantity supplied at time t, − γ is the intercept, δ is the
price elasticity of supply, and P t−1 is the price at time t-1. Without regulation or other
impediments to market efficiency, markets are expected to reach equilibrium in the long-run.
However, because homes are a commodity that cannot be produced in real time to meet the
demand for housing, there exists a temporal gap between the supply of housing and the demand
of housing. Suppliers of housing, then, must react to the disequilibrium by increasing or
decreasing the production of new houses. Suppliers will react by producing X quantity of homes,
then the price of housing will adjust, causing the following period’s production to adjust, and so
on.
Chiang goes on to describe a model of Prices as a function of Prices of the previous
period, as well as the Inventory, as in Equation 3:

Equation 3 : P t+1 = P t − σ (Qst − Qdt )
Logically, it makes sense that the housing inventory will be represented by how much larger the
quantity supplied is relative to the quantity demanded. However, in this paper, we are attempting
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to describe the reverse: how much larger is the quantity demanded than the quantity supplied? It
stands to reason that the number of new units produced will be influenced by the number of units
that already exist. Why go to the trouble of getting legal authorization and investing time and
money building new units, when the price of new units produced will be reduced by the presence
of existing, unoccupied housing?
We must also recognize that equilibrium in a growing and changing country is not
stationary, and that the quantity demanded and quantity supplied are influenced by more factors
than just the price. Factors like the price of housing, a growing population, growing income, and
the 30 year mortgage rate should have a relationship with the quantity of homes demanded, as
shown in Equation 4.

Equation 4 : Qd t = f (P t , P opt , Inct , 30 yr I/Rt )
Knowing that homes will not be ready for purchase for some period of time after starting
construction, housing suppliers must estimate demand during the period in which their product
will become available on the market.
As mentioned above, the price of housing, which is a determinant of the expected return
of suppliers, the vacancy rate, the cost of capital for suppliers, and the construction costs are
relevant considerations related to the supply of housing, as shown in Equation 5.

Equation 5 : Qst = f (P t−1 , V acancyRatet−1 , 2 yr I/Rt−1 , LP I t−1 )
More accurately, the amount of new housing supply is a function of what suppliers expected
market conditions to be when the new supply hit the market. Suppliers are looking to take
advantage of an undersupply of housing by producing more housing, collecting the difference
between the price at which houses are sold and the cost to produce such housing. In reality,
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suppliers of housing want to take advantage of future conditions, such that the price of housing
they produce will be sufficiently high when the housing is ready for sale.
As the numbers of new units supplied and demanded are a response to changes in these
other factors, and that the equilibrium at time t is moving along with these other variables, our
model may resemble Equation 6.
Equation 6 : ln(P ermsIss)t+1 = αt + β 1 ΔP ricet + β 2 ΔP opt + β 3 ΔInct + β 4 Δ30yrI/Rt
+ β 5 ΔV acancyRatet + β 6 Δ2yrI/Rt + β 7 ln(LP I t ) + β 8 30yrI/Rt + β 9 V acancyRatet
+ β 10 2yrI/Rt + β 11 ln(P ermsIsst )
Definitions can be found in the ‘Variable Definitions’ table in the appendix. In a totally
efficient market, the number of permits issued authorizing construction should represent how
much larger the quantity demanded is than the quantity supplied. However, because the
government can determine how many units can be produced via limiting access to building
permits, the number of units authorized by building permits may not cover the excess demand.
Additionally, firms in the short-run are not incentivized to completely close the gap between the
quantity demanded and quantity supplied, as this would reduce the price, and therefore returns
per unit.
Due to price being a force driving supply upwards and demand downwards, it seems
difficult to hypothesize about the coefficient the change in price would have. With more people
entering a state, we would expect demand for housing to increase, necessitating the construction
of new housing units authorized by building permits, resulting in a positive value for β 2 .
Similarly, with more income available, we should expect demand for new housing to increase,
and thus a positive coefficient on β 3 . As mortgage rates rise, we would expect a decrease in
demand for new housing, resulting in a negative β 4 and β 8 . With a higher percentage of vacant
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homes, we should expect suppliers to restrict production of new housing, so we should expect a
negative value for β 5 and β 9 . As 2-year interest rates rise, we might expect a smaller amount of
new housing production, as the cost of debt for suppliers is higher, resulting in a negative value
for β 6 and β 9 . As the price of lumber increases, we should expect a decrease in supply, as costs
to builders increases, resulting in a negative value for β 7 . If when controlling for the rest of
these variables, the relationship between the number of permits issued from the previous period
to the current period is positive, this might suggest that the limitations the state is placing on
construction are not allowing for the market to adequately meet demand.
Data
The panel data collected is from 2005 to 2019 (n=15) at an annual frequency for the
states of California, Washington, Oregon, and the United States as a whole. While mortgage
rates vary by state, the variance between states in a given year is much smaller than the amount
of variance seen over time. For instance, in 2019 California, Oregon, and Washington had
average APR rates of 4.83%, 4.85%, and 4.89% respectively.1 In addition, the data for the annual
nationwide average data for mortgage rates was available, while historical state data was not
available. The number of building permits issued annually in the United States, California,
Oregon, and Washington for the period are from the Census Bureau website. Home prices by
region and year are sourced from Zillow. Population data is sourced from FRED St. Louis Fed.
Per capita personal income is sourced from FRED St. Louis Fed. The real interest rate of 30-year
mortgages and 2-year Treasury notes were sourced from FRED St. Louis Fed. The vacancy rate
is sourced from FRED St. Louis Fed. The price of lumber index is sourced from FRED St. Louis
Fed.
Guerin, Jessica. “This Is How Mortgage Rates Vary by State.” HousingWire (blog), February 12, 2019.
https://www.housingwire.com/articles/48165-this-is-how-mortgage-rates-vary-by-state/.
1
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Summary Statistics
Table 1 shows the summary statistics by state for the growth rate of the home value
index, population, and personal income. Table 2 shows the levels of the number of permits
issued, the home value index, population, personal income, and the vacancy rate. Table 3 shows
the summary statistics for the variables that are considered consistent across different states,
being the real 30-year interest rate and its change, the real 2-year interest rate and its change, and
the lumber price index. While there may be differences in mortgage and interest rates between
states in a given period, the differences between periods are generally much larger than those
between states. Additionally, California, Oregon, and Washington are of a similar region and
thus deviation in terms of the cost of producing and transporting lumber could be expected to be
relatively small. Graphs visualizing different relevant data can be found in the ‘Data
Visualization’ section.

Results
We regress the panel data upon the natural log of the number of permits issued the
following year using fixed effects. Table 4 shows the results. When the natural log of permits
issued the current year is omitted, as shown in Model 1, the growth rate of prices, the natural log
of the lumber price index, the real 30-year mortgage rate, the change in the real 30-year
mortgage rate, and the change in the real two-year interest rate have statistically significant
relationships with the natural log of permits issued the following year. For a 1 percentage point
increase in the growth rate of prices, we find a 0.973% increase in the number of permits issued
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the following year. This suggests that as developers see prices increasing, they tend to make
more investments in housing. For a 1% increase in the lumber price index, we find roughly a
0.815% increase in the number of permits issued. This is surprising, as we would expect higher
construction costs to decrease the number of housing starts. For a one percentage point increase
in the real 30-year mortgage rate, we find roughly a 11.2% decrease in the number of permits
issued the following year. For a one percentage point increase in the change in the real 30-year
mortgage rate, we find roughly a 18% decrease in the number of permits issued the following
year. As mortgage rates increase, it seems that developers expect demand for housing to
decrease, reducing developer incentive to invest in new construction. For a one percentage point
increase in the change in the real two-year interest rate, we find roughly a 23% increase in the
number of permits issued the following year. This is somewhat surprising, given that a higher
cost of debt for borrowers would intuitively reduce the number of new housing supplied, as
interest expense would increase.
In Model 2, which omits the growth rate of income and the change in the vacancy rate
which were insignificant in Model 1, coefficients were quite similar to their value in Model 1.
The vacancy rate now became statistically significant. For a one percentage point increase in the
vacancy rate, we find roughly a 12.5% decrease in the number of permits issued the following
year.
In Model 3, once adding the natural log of the number of permits issued the current year
to the model, we find relatively similar results. The growth rate of prices and the level of the
30-year mortgage rate become no longer statistically significant. However, the level of the
two-year rate becomes significant, but with quite a small negative coefficient.
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Model 4 represents Model 3 with the growth rate of the population, the growth rate of
income, the natural log of the lumber price index, the level of the 30-year mortgage rate, and the
change in the vacancy rate omitted, as they were not statistically significant in Model 3. Again,
we see that the vacancy rate shows a statistically significant relationship with the natural log of
the number of permits issued the following year. The growth rate of prices becomes slightly
statistically significant, but has a relatively small coefficient; for a 1 percentage point increase in
the growth rate of prices, we find roughly a 0.458% increase in the number of permits issued.
Model 5 represents a similar panel fixed-effects regression model, but regressed upon the
natural log of the number of permits issued in the current year. We find that the growth rate of
prices, the real 30-year interest rate, and the real two-year interest rate have a statistically
significant relationship with the natural log of the number of permits issued in the current year.
For a one percentage point increase in the growth rate of home prices, we find roughly a 1.7%
increase in the number of permits issued during that year. For a one percentage point increase in
the real 30-year mortgage rate, the number of permits issued the following year decreases by
26%. For a one percentage point increase in the real two-year interest rate, we find a 25.4%
increase in the number of permits issued the following year.

Conclusion
Housing starts are an important indicator of economic health and growth. Intuitively, if
fewer new homes are being bought, the labor force is seeing relatively little expansion, while the
lack of new supply can drive up prices in crowded urban areas. If people are not confident in
their ability to take on a mortgage, there will be less demand for new housing, and it seems less
likely that people are doing well financially.
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Using panel regression with state fixed effects, we find that home prices, interest rates,
and changes in interest rates are the main drivers of the number of housing permits issued.
However, the constant was comparatively quite large, and the number of permits issued the
previous year had a strong relationship with the number of permits issued the following year,
suggesting that much of the variation in housing permits is not captured by our models. As the
growth rate of prices increases, the number of permits issued increases as well, as the expected
return for developers increases. The 30-year mortgage rate had negative relationships with the
number of permits issued the following year, as expected.
However, the more interesting findings lie with the two-year interest rate and the change
in the two-year interest rate. We find that for a one percentage point increase in the change in the
two-year interest rate, the number of permits issued the following year increases by roughly
0.25%. Yet, for a one percentage point increase in the level of the two-year interest rate, the
number of permits issued in the current year increases by 0.25% as well. While we had initially
expected the two-year rate to capture the cost of debt to builders, we found it to have a positive
effect during this period, possibly signalling strong demand for housing in the future. Interest
rates were significantly cut from 2008 to 2009, and housing starts plummeted along with them.
So, interpreted differently, our results show that in years where interest rates are low, housing
permits issued are also low. When short-term interest rates are cut, housing permits the following
year decreases as well. As was mentioned earlier in this paper, the federal funds rate was kept
incredibly low from 2008 to 2015, which makes up a significant portion of our data set. Our data
begins in 2005 at the peak of the housing bubble, and its rapid decline contributed strongly to our
results. While normally, low interest rates stimulate residential investment, as McCarthy and
Peach (2002) found, this period of time is simply unprecedented. Developers have been wary of
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investing in new construction, as the recent crash was the direct result of over-issuing mortgages,
and over-supplying homes. Interest rates acted as a signaling mechanism of macroeconomic
health during this time period.
Due to data availability, we were limited to the years from 2005-2019, which featured the
largest boom-bust period of housing in American history. While it does seem possible that cuts
to interest rates would be associated with declining numbers of permits issued, as interest rate
cuts tend to coincide with bad macroeconomic conditions, we would likely see that cuts to
interest rates are followed by increasing numbers of permits issued over the next few years, as
the economy has time to pick back up again. If historical housing starts data becomes available,
it would be quite interesting to see whether the results my study found regarding short-term
interest rates are obtained in other periods, or whether they would support the findings of
McCarthy and Peach (2002).
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Appendix

Table 1

Table 1 shows the mean, standard deviation, median, minimum, and maximum values for the respective growth rates
of Zillow’s Home Value Index, population, and personal income in California, Washington, and Oregon for the
years 2005-2019.
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Table 2

Table 2 describes the mean, standard deviation, median, minimum and maximum values for the number of housing
permits issued, Zillow’s Home Value Index, the population, personal income, and the vacancy rate in California,
Oregon, and Washington for the years 2005-2019.
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Table 3

Table 3 shows the mean, standard deviation, median, minimum and maximum values of the real 30-year mortgage
rate and its change from the previous period, the 2-year Treasury bill rate and its change from the previous period,
and the Lumber Price Index.
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Table 4: Regression results, dependent variable: ln(permits issued the following year), fixed effects
Model ->

1

2

lnperm

3

4

0.451***
(0.09)

0.438***
(0.07)
0.00458*
(0.0027)

pricegrowthr

0.00973***
(0.0035)

0.00932***
(0.29)

0.00246
(0.0029)

popgrowthr

0.07314
(7.61)

0.070
(0.07)

0.08671
(0.06)

incgrowthr

0.00043
(0.0089)

vacr

-0.107
(0.08)

-0.125**
(0.06)

-0.052
(0.06)

lnlpi

0.815***
(0.30)

0.783***
(0.27)

0.711***
(0.22)

realthirty

-0.112**
(0.05)

-0.110***
(0.04)

0.011
(0.04)

realtwo

0.037
(0.03)

0.033
(0.28)

-0.084**
(0.03)

-0.083***
(0.02)

drthirty

-0.180***
(0.03)

-0.185***
(0.03)

-0.193***
(0.03)

-0.206***
(0.02)

drtwo

0.228***
(0.03)

0.231***
(0.027)

0.244***
(0.02)

0.252***
(0.02)

dvr

-0.020
(0.06)

_cons

6.539***
(1.66)

6.738***
(1.51)

1.886
(1.53)

6.075***
(0.80)

Within R^2

0.9539

0.9537

0.9760

0.9662

Between R^2

0.0358

0.0066

0.9963

0.9991

Overall R^2

0.2308

0.2372

0.8466

0.8624

Fixed Effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

0.314
(0.65)
-0.165***
(0.04)

-0.040
(0.05)

Table 4 shows regression results with the natural log of the number of permits issued the following period as the
dependent variable.
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Table 5: Regression results, dependent variable: ln(permits issued the current
year), fixed effects
Model

5

pricegrowthr

0.017***
(.005)

popgrowthr

0.011
(0.10)

incgrowthr

-0.005
(0.01)

vacr

-0.090
(.11)

lnlpi

0.251
(0.44)

realthirty

-0.263***
(0.07)

realtwo

0.254***
(0.04)

drthirty

0.0210
(0.05)

drtwo

-0.022
(0.04)

dvr

0.041
(0.09)

_cons

10.052***
(2.44)

Within R^2

0.9086

Between R^2

0.0137

Overall R^2

0.2487

Fixed Effects

Yes

Table 5 shows regression results with the natural log of the number of permits issued the contemporaneous period
as the dependent variable.
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Variable Definitions
Variable

Definition

PermsIss

The number of new housing units authorized by building permits

lnperm

The natural log of the number of units authorized by housing permits

leadlnp

lnperm of period t+1

HomePrice

Zillow Home Value Index for homes in the 35th to 65th percentile range

lnprice

The natural log of home price index

Pricegrowthr

The percentage change in the Zillow Home Value Index from the previous
year

Population

The number of people by state/country

lnpop

The natural log of the population

Popgrowthr

The percentage change in population from the previous period

Income

Per Capita Personal Income

lninc

The natural log of per capita personal income

Incgrowthr

The percentage change in income from the previous period

realthirty

The real 30 year mortgage interest rate

thirtyyr

The nominal 30 year mortgage interest rate

drthirty

The change in the 30 year mortgage interest rate from the previous period

realtwo

The real 2 year note interest rate

twoyr

The nominal 2 year note interest rate

drtwo

The change in the 2 year note interest rate from the previous period

Vacr

The percentage of homes that are vacant

dvr

The change in the vacancy rate from the previous period

LumberPrice

The Lumber Price Index

lnlpi

The natural log of the lumber price index

dLPI

The change in the Lumber Price Index
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Data Visualization
Figure 1

Figure 1 shows the number of housing permits issued annually in California, Oregon, and Washington for the years
2005-2019.

26

Figure 2

Figure 2 shows the Zillow Home Value Index for California, Oregon, and Washington for the years 2005-2019.
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Figure 3

Figure 3 shows the annual Lumber Price Index for the years 2005-2019.
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Figure 4

Figure 4 shows the annual population growth rate in California, Oregon, Washington, and the United States for the
years 2005-2019.
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Figure 5

Figure 5 shows Personal Income Per Capita in California, Oregon, Washington, and the United States for the years
2005-2019.
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Figure 6

Figure 6 shows the Vacancy Rate in California, Oregon, Washington, and the United States for the years
2005-2019.
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Figure 7

Figure 7 shows the nominal 30-year mortgage and 2-year interest rates in the United States for the years
2005-2019.
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Figure 8

Figure 7 shows the nominal 30-year mortgage and 2-year interest rates in the United States for the years
2005-2019.
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Figure 9

Figure 9 shows the inflation rate in the United States for the years 2005-2019.
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